Selfish Corporations

105 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2022 Last revised: 19 Jul 2023

See all articles by Emanuele Colonnelli

Emanuele Colonnelli

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Niels Joachim Christfort Gormsen

University of Chicago

Timothy McQuade

University of California, Berkeley

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2022

Abstract

We study how perceptions of corporate responsibility influence policy preferences and the effectiveness of corporate communication when agents have imperfect memory recall. Using a new large-scale survey of U.S. citizens on their support for corporate bailouts, we first establish that the public demands corporations to behave better within society, a sentiment we label “big business discontent.” Using random variation in the order of survey sections and in the exposure to animated videos, we then show that priming respondents to think about corporate responsibility lowers the support for bailouts. This finding suggests that big business discontent influences policy preferences. Furthermore, we find that messages which paint a positive picture of corporate responsibility can “backfire,” as doing so brings attention to an aspect on which the public has negative views. In contrast, reframing corporate bailouts in terms of economic trade-offs increases support for the policy. We develop a memory-based model of decision-making and communication to rationalize these findings.

Suggested Citation

Colonnelli, Emanuele and Gormsen, Niels Joachim Christfort and McQuade, Timothy, Selfish Corporations (October 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30576, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4259487

Emanuele Colonnelli (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://emanuelecolonnelli.com

Niels Joachim Christfort Gormsen

University of Chicago

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Timothy McQuade

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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