Voting With Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism

24 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2022

See all articles by Vijay Mohan

Vijay Mohan

RMIT University

Peyman Khezr

RMIT University

Chris Berg

RMIT University

Date Written: October 27, 2022

Abstract

Blockchain applications are increasingly experimenting with novel governance mechanisms that address issues that are important for their community: resistance to voter fraud in the form a Sybil attack; resistance to the formation of a plutocracy within the community; and, the ability to express preference intensity. In this paper, we take a closer look at these issues confronting decentralized governance. Our contribution is three-fold: first, we lay some analytical foundations for the formal modelling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that a voting mechanism with a single instrument for expressing preference intensity, such as the quantity of tokens, cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and plutocracy formation; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument of voting influence (time commitment) for plutocracy resistance.

Keywords: Decentralized governance, blockchain, smart contract, voting, Sybil resistance, plutocracy, bonds

JEL Classification: D73, D82, G12

Suggested Citation

Mohan, Vijay and Khezr, Peyman and Berg, Chris, Voting With Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism (October 27, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4259599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4259599

Vijay Mohan (Contact Author)

RMIT University ( email )

124 La Trobe Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Peyman Khezr

RMIT University ( email )

124 La Trobe Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Chris Berg

RMIT University ( email )

124 La Trobe Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
188
PlumX Metrics