Pricing and Electric Vehicle Charging Equilibria

22 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2022

See all articles by Trivikram Dokka

Trivikram Dokka

Queen's University Belfast

Jorge Bruno

University of Winchester

Sonali SenGupta

Queens University Belfast

Sakib Anwar

University of Winchester

Date Written: October 26, 2022

Abstract

We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that, taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost into account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Electric Vehicles, Pricing, Nash equilibrium, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Mediation, Herding, Dissatisfaction cost

JEL Classification: C61, C72, D4, D11, D82

Suggested Citation

Dokka, Trivikram and Bruno, Jorge and SenGupta, Sonali and Anwar, Chowdhury, Pricing and Electric Vehicle Charging Equilibria (October 26, 2022). Queen’s Management School Working Paper 10, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4260879 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4260879

Trivikram Dokka

Queen's University Belfast ( email )

25 University Square
Belfast, BT7 1NN
Ireland

Jorge Bruno

University of Winchester ( email )

West Hill
Hampshire
Winchester, SO22 4NR
United Kingdom

Sonali SenGupta (Contact Author)

Queens University Belfast ( email )

Ireland

Chowdhury Anwar

University of Winchester ( email )

West Hill
Hampshire
Winchester, SO22 4NR
United Kingdom

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