Economic Consequences of Operating Lease Recognition

65 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2022 Last revised: 17 Nov 2022

See all articles by Mark (Shuai) Ma

Mark (Shuai) Ma

University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 28, 2022

Abstract

Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-02 (ASU 2016-02) generated considerable debate between managers and standard setters. We find evidence that after issuance of ASU 2016-02, lessee firms decreased their use of long-term operating leases, increased their use of short-term operating leases, and increased their use of capital expenditures. The shift from long-term operating leases to capital expenditures is more pronounced for firms that had greater reporting incentives to use operating leases prior to ASU 2016-02. However, we find no evidence that the change in leasing behavior leads to negative outcomes predicted by managers (i.e., no evidence of a decrease in reported firm performance, a decrease in firm value, increase in firm risk, decrease in credit ratings, increase in debt covenant violations, or decrease in employment). Our study adds to the literature on the real impacts of accounting standards on managers’ investment behavior and economic consequences for lessee firms and their stakeholders.

Keywords: Leases, recognition versus disclosure, economic consequences, information quality

JEL Classification: D92, M41, M44, M45, O16

Suggested Citation

Ma, Mark (Shuai) and Thomas, Wayne B., Economic Consequences of Operating Lease Recognition (October 28, 2022). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4261236

Mark (Shuai) Ma (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma ( email )

Michael F. Price College of Business,
307 W Brooks, Rm 212B
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-5789 (Phone)
405-325-7348 (Fax)

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