Subscription Networks, Verification, and Media Bias

66 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2022 Last revised: 8 Mar 2024

See all articles by Chin-Chia Hsu

Chin-Chia Hsu

Office of Applied Research, Microsoft

Amir Ajorlou

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

Muhamet Yildiz

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Ali Jadbabaie

Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Date Written: October 31, 2022

Abstract

We study how individuals choose among biased information sources with persuasion motives when the news may or may not be informative. We develop a game-theoretic model with anonymous subscribers with diverse ideological perspectives and two news media with opposing ideological perspectives. The news media are motivated to influence the public opinion through news verification and selective disclosure. In our model, each individual subscribes to a news media, and then each news media chooses whether to verify the informativeness of a private signal and whether to disclose it to its subscribers. In equilibrium, moderate subscribers subscribe to the news media with the opposing view, exhibiting anti-homophily. In contrast, extremist subscribers subscribe to the intermediary with aligned view, exhibiting homophily.

Keywords: Information choices, network formation, strategic communication, misinformation, verification

JEL Classification: D01, D82, D83, D85

Suggested Citation

Hsu, Chin-Chia and Ajorlou, Amir and Yildiz, Muhamet and Jadbabaie, Ali, Subscription Networks, Verification, and Media Bias (October 31, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4263099 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4263099

Chin-Chia Hsu (Contact Author)

Office of Applied Research, Microsoft ( email )

One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
United States

Amir Ajorlou

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems ( email )

E32-D569, 32 Vassar Street,
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
215-919-3234 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mit.edu/~ajorlou

Muhamet Yildiz

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-522
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-5331 (Phone)
617-253-6915 (Fax)

Ali Jadbabaie

Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( email )

77 Massachusetts Ave E18-309C
E18-309C
02139, MA MA 02139
United States
6172537339 (Phone)
6172537339 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/www/jadbabai

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