Subscription Networks, Verification, and Media Bias
66 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2022 Last revised: 8 Mar 2024
Date Written: October 31, 2022
Abstract
We study how individuals choose among biased information sources with persuasion motives when the news may or may not be informative. We develop a game-theoretic model with anonymous subscribers with diverse ideological perspectives and two news media with opposing ideological perspectives. The news media are motivated to influence the public opinion through news verification and selective disclosure. In our model, each individual subscribes to a news media, and then each news media chooses whether to verify the informativeness of a private signal and whether to disclose it to its subscribers. In equilibrium, moderate subscribers subscribe to the news media with the opposing view, exhibiting anti-homophily. In contrast, extremist subscribers subscribe to the intermediary with aligned view, exhibiting homophily.
Keywords: Information choices, network formation, strategic communication, misinformation, verification
JEL Classification: D01, D82, D83, D85
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation