Dynamic Stability in Population Games derived from Social Decision Problems

25 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2022

See all articles by Anne Balter

Anne Balter

Tilburg University; Netspar

Johannes M. Schumacher

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE)

Nikolaus Schweizer

Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Date Written: October 26, 2022

Abstract

As shown in a companion paper (Balter et al., Solving Maxmin Optimization Problems via Population Games, SSRN 4264811), solutions of a certain class of maxmin optimization problems can be found from symmetric Nash equilibria of related population games. In this paper we give sufficient conditions for such equilibria to arise as locally stable fixed points of the exponential form of the multiplicative weights algorithm, which is a time-discretized version of the standard replicator dynamics.

Keywords: Maxmin optimization, population games, collective decision, Nash equilibrium, local stability

JEL Classification: C61, C73, D70, D81, G11

Suggested Citation

Balter, Anne and Schumacher, J.M. (Hans) and Schweizer, Nikolaus, Dynamic Stability in Population Games derived from Social Decision Problems (October 26, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4264872 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4264872

Anne Balter

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

J.M. (Hans) Schumacher (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Nikolaus Schweizer

Tilburg School of Economics and Management ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE Ti
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
178
PlumX Metrics