Disrupting Drug Markets: The Effects of Crackdowns on Rogue Opioid Suppliers

ERID Working Paper Number 313

51 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2023 Last revised: 31 May 2024

See all articles by Adam Soliman

Adam Soliman

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: October 31, 2022

Abstract

This paper estimates the impacts of doctor crackdowns on the quantity demanded of prescription opioids, across-market substitution, and across-product substitution. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the timing and location of administrative actions, I find that cracking down on a single doctor decreases county-level opioid dispensing by 10%. This decline persists across space and grows over time. Additionally, significant heroin substitution occurs, yet overall overdose mortality decreases. These results highlight a critical tradeoff policymakers should consider with targeted crackdowns: reductions in the flow of new users must be balanced against the harm that arises when existing users substitute to more dangerous drugs.

Note:
Funding Information: None to declare.

Declaration of Interests: None to declare.

Keywords: drug epidemic, opioids, enforcement

JEL Classification: H12, I10, K42

Suggested Citation

Soliman, Adam, Disrupting Drug Markets: The Effects of Crackdowns on Rogue Opioid Suppliers (October 31, 2022). ERID Working Paper Number 313, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4266020 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4266020

Adam Soliman (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://adamsoliman.github.io/

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