Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America

51 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 1996 Last revised: 8 Oct 2022

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ricardo Hausmann

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Rudolf Hommes

Universidad de los Andes

Ernesto Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1996

Abstract

In this paper we collect detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries. We classify these institutions on a `hierarchical'/'collegial' scale, as a function of their transparency and the existence of legislative constraints on the deficit. We then show that `hierarchical' and transparent procedures have been associated with more fiscal discipline in Latin America in the eighties and early nineties.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Hausmann, Ricardo and Hommes, Rudolf and Stein, Ernesto Hugo, Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America (May 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5586, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4268

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Ricardo Hausmann

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/ricardo-hausmann

Rudolf Hommes

Universidad de los Andes

Av Principal de Los Chorros de Milla
Merida, 5101
Venezuela

Ernesto Hugo Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue, NW
Research Department
Washington, DC 20577
United States

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