The New Noncompete: The Training Repayment Agreement Provision (TRAP) as a Scheme to Retain Workers through Debt

3 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2022 Last revised: 11 Nov 2022

Date Written: November 9, 2022

Abstract

A growing number of employers are attempting to restrict worker mobility through Training Repayment Agreement Provisions (TRAPs) in addition to--or instead of--traditional noncompete agreements. Under TRAPs, a worker must pay to quit, purportedly for the cost of training. But many workers under TRAPs report that the training is often not useful for their skills development. This piece proposes that, by offering debt-inducing services like training to workers via TRAPs, employers have become creditors and could be liable for predatory terms not only under employment laws but also consumer laws.

Keywords: contract law, consumer law, employment law, labor law, training, personnel economics, economic perspectives, legal theory

JEL Classification: J00, J2, J3, J4,J5, J6, M5

Suggested Citation

Harris, Jonathan, The New Noncompete: The Training Repayment Agreement Provision (TRAP) as a Scheme to Retain Workers through Debt (November 9, 2022). Northwestern University Law Review Of Note, Nov. 9, 2022, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2022-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4273728

Jonathan Harris (Contact Author)

LMU Loyola Law School ( email )

919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States

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