Less is More

52 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2022 Last revised: 30 Jan 2023

Date Written: October 28, 2022

Abstract

We show in a model of over-the-counter trading that customers in equilibrium may choose to contact very few dealers to incentivize maximum liquidity provision—“less is more.” This happens when dealers’ liquidity supply is sufficiently elastic to competition. This novel mechanism is orthogonal to conventional concerns, such as contacting or search cost, private information, and relationship. A social planner would mandate even fewer contacts than the market outcome, where customers induce excessive dealer competition. The model predicts endogenous market power, yields implications for regulation and design of electronic platforms, and speaks to customers’ search behavior and their execution quality.

Keywords: over-the-counter markets, dealers, trading connections, request-for-quote

JEL Classification: D1, G1

Suggested Citation

Yueshen, Bart Zhou and Zou, Junyuan, Less is More (October 28, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4274063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4274063

Bart Zhou Yueshen (Contact Author)

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Junyuan Zou

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

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