Enforcing Fintech Competition: Some Reflections on Institutional Design

Forthcoming in Konstantinos Stylianou, Marios Iacovides, and Björn Lundqvist (eds), Fintech Competition: Law, Policy, and Market Organisation (Bloomsbury Hart, 2023)

22 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2022

See all articles by Jens-Uwe Franck

Jens-Uwe Franck

University of Mannheim - Department of Law

Date Written: November 10, 2022

Abstract

This paper focuses on institutional design aspects of the enforcement of competition law and other procompetitive regulation in fintech markets. Those interventions may prove necessary because the market entry of technology-enabled innovation may depend on accessing other (competing) market operators’ data and facilities or the enabling of data portability and interoperability of complementing financial services. Basic choices of allocating enforcement powers are identified. Five institutional design topics are discussed: bureaucratic enforcement styles and strategies; efficient use of administrative resources; motivation of staff; treatment of conflicting regulatory objectives; and legitimising elements in competition procedures.

Keywords: fintech, competition enforcement, enforcing regulation, institutional design, enforcement style, regulatory capture

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K22, K23, K42

Suggested Citation

Franck, Jens-Uwe, Enforcing Fintech Competition: Some Reflections on Institutional Design (November 10, 2022). Forthcoming in Konstantinos Stylianou, Marios Iacovides, and Björn Lundqvist (eds), Fintech Competition: Law, Policy, and Market Organisation (Bloomsbury Hart, 2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4275962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4275962

Jens-Uwe Franck (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Law ( email )

Schloss Westflügel
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

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