On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare *

60 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2022

See all articles by Alex Arsenault Morin

Alex Arsenault Morin

Queen's University

Hayri Alper Arslan

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Matthew L. Gentry

Florida State University

Date Written: May 22, 2024

Abstract

This paper empirically explores how varying the timing of a sequence of auctions affects both bidder behavior and the welfare of procurers and bidders. We develop a structural auction model with endogenous participation in which bidding may be either simultaneous or sequential, and bidders may perceive auctioned objects as either complements or substitutes. We then apply this model to data on auctions for roof-maintenance projects in Montreal. We show that

Suggested Citation

Arsenault Morin, Alex and Arslan, Hayri Alper and Gentry, Matthew L., On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare * (May 22, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4275991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4275991

Alex Arsenault Morin

Queen's University ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada

Hayri Alper Arslan (Contact Author)

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

6900 North Loop 1604 West
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States

Matthew L. Gentry

Florida State University ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.matthewgentry.net

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