Policy Coordination and Selective Corruption Control in China

Abstract

In autocracies facing widespread corruption, the allocation of the scant attention available for fighting corruption strongly affects corruption control. Although research has found that authoritarian regimes tend to fight corruption selectively, it is unknown whether and how autocracies allocate attention across different policy areas to combat corruption. We propose that single-party authoritarian regimes can steer anticorruption attention to the policy domains prioritized by the central authority through the mechanism of cross-organizational policy coordination. Using original datasets compiled from Chinese governmental and procuratorial policy papers from 1998 to 2016, we demonstrate that Chinese prosecutors direct anticorruption attention to the policy domains accentuated in the central government’s major reforms. Our field interviews support this finding and reveal possible disruption of anticorruption efforts in policy domains falling off the central government’s top list. Thus, we extend the research on political influence over anticorruption agencies and show that single-party regimes can instrumentalize anticorruption to serve the government’s policy agenda, driving the allocation of limited anticorruption attention across policy areas.

Keywords: anticorruption attention, China, policy coordination, selective corruption control, single-party authoritarian regimes