Self-Enforcing Power Dynamics

Abstract

I propose a dynamic model to explain why some rulers seek to monopolize power, while others share power, refraining from becoming as powerful as they could potentially be. In the model, the ruler allocates a flow of spoils between herself and an opposition. Over time, the opposition gets opportunities to seize control of the spoils by force, while the ruler gets opportunities to increase power, defined as her chance of defeating the opposition in conflict. Arrivals of these opportunities are stochastic and conditional on the ruler’s power. The results depend crucially on the ruler's power potential---how powerful she can potentially become, which is exogenously given and context-specific. When this potential is either very high or very low, the ruler always seeks to consolidate power, fully fulfilling its potential. When the ruler's power potential is intermediate, multiple equilibria are possible. With mutual trust, the ruler and the opposition can form a self-enforcing power-sharing agreement under which the ruler credibly commits to restrain power at an endogenously emerging level and conflict never occurs. With mutual suspicion, however, the ruler’s power consolidation can become a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes conflict inevitable.

Keywords: Power dynamics, Power sharing, Self-enforcing, Commitment