Brand Reallocation, Concentration, and Growth

75 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2022

See all articles by Jeremy Pearce

Jeremy Pearce

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Liangjie Wu

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Date Written: November 18, 2022

Abstract

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firm-branding activities. We show empirically that firms build market share by creating new brands, developing their existing brands, and buying established brands from other firms. Sales and prices of the underlying branded products tend to rise when a large firm acquires a brand from a small firm. To interpret these findings and quantify the implications, we introduce an endogenous growth model where brand creation, maturity, and reallocation determine both market concentration and economic growth. On net, brand reallocation improves efficiency in the quantified model, even as it increases concentration by over 30%; blocking brand reallocation would reduce welfare by 2%. A tax on brand reallocation alleviates pricing distortions from concentration but nevertheless reduces efficiency by slowing growth. In contrast, a subsidy on brand or firm entry can alleviate pricing distortions and raise growth. In markets with fast maturing brands, subsidies to entry become more effective and blocking brand reallocation becomes more costly. Broadly, our framework finds that effective industrial policies require attention to brand maturity, heterogeneity, and fit with the production and distribution capabilities of the parent firm.

Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Firm Dynamics, Productivity, Market Concentration, Product Innovation, Reallocation, Mergers & Acquisitions, Brands, Trademarks, Intangible Assets

JEL Classification: O31, O32, O34, O41, D22, D43, L11, L13, L22

Suggested Citation

Pearce, Jeremy and Wu, Liangjie, Brand Reallocation, Concentration, and Growth (November 18, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4279983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4279983

Jeremy Pearce (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Liangjie Wu

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.liangjiewu.com

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