Allocation Rules for Network Games

42 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2003  

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Date Written: June 2003

Abstract

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

Keywords: Networks, Network Games, Allocation Rules, Cooperative Games

JEL Classification: A14, C71, C72

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O., Allocation Rules for Network Games (June 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 51.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=428003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.428003

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

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