Does High Frequency Market Manipulation Harm Market Quality?

55 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2022 Last revised: 25 Oct 2023

See all articles by Jonathan Brogaard

Jonathan Brogaard

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Dan Li

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

Jeffrey Yang

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Date Written: November 18, 2022

Abstract

Manipulation of financial markets has long been a concern. With the automation of financial markets, the potential for high frequency market manipulation has arisen. Yet, such behavior is hidden within vast sums of order book data, making it difficult to define and to detect. We develop a tangible definition of one type of manipulation, spoofing. Using proprietary user-level identified order book data, we show the determinants of spoofing. Exploiting SEC Litigation Releases that exogenously reduce spoofing, we show causal evidence that spoofing increases return volatility, increases trading costs, and decreases price efficiency. The findings indicate that spoofing harms liquidity and price discovery.

Keywords: high-frequency trading, market quality, market manipulation

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Brogaard, Jonathan and Li, Dan and Yang, Jeffrey, Does High Frequency Market Manipulation Harm Market Quality? (November 18, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4280120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4280120

Jonathan Brogaard (Contact Author)

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanbrogaard.com

Dan Li

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen ( email )

Jeffrey Yang

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jeffreytyang.github.io

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