Combating Corruptions in International Business Transactions

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 670

29 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2003

See all articles by Marco Celentani

Marco Celentani

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics

Juan-José Ganuza

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in which signatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign public officials.

Keywords: International corruption, OECD convention

JEL Classification: C72, D72, F23, K42

Suggested Citation

Celentani, Marco and Ganuza, Juan and Peydro, Jose-Luis, Combating Corruptions in International Business Transactions (March 2003). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 670, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=428163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.428163

Marco Celentani

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain
+34-91-624 9546 (Phone)
+34-91-624 9875 (Fax)

Juan Ganuza (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34-93) 542 27 19 (Phone)
(34-98) 542 17 46 (Fax)

Jose-Luis Peydro

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

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