Can Anti-Vaping Policies Curb Drinking Externalities? Evidence from E-Cigarette Taxation and Traffic Fatalities

94 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2022 Last revised: 20 Oct 2024

See all articles by Dhaval Dave

Dhaval Dave

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - NY Office; Bentley University - Department of Economics

Yang Liang

San Diego State University - Department of Economics

Catherin Maclean

George Mason University

Joseph Sabia

San Diego State University - Department of Economics

Matthew Braaksma

The University of Minnesota

Date Written: November 2022

Abstract

Teenage drinking is a major public health concern, generating social costs of over $28 billion per year, including substantial external costs associated with alcohol-related traffic fatalities. At the same time, the high rate of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) use among teenagers has been deemed “an epidemic” by the U.S. Surgeon General, with state and local policymakers turning to e-cigarette taxes as a popular policy tool to curb nicotine vaping. This study is the first to explore the spillover effects of e-cigarette taxes on teenage drinking and alcohol-related traffic fatalities. We find that a one-dollar increase in e-cigarette taxes is associated with a 1 to 2 percentage-point reduction in the probability of binge drinking among teenagers and a 5 to 10 percent reduction in traffic fatalities involving teenagers driving under the influence of alcohol. Together, these results suggest the presence of alcohol-related health benefits from e-cigarette taxation.

Suggested Citation

Dave, Dhaval and Dave, Dhaval and Liang, Yang and Maclean, Joanna Catherine and Sabia, Joseph and Braaksma, Matthew, Can Anti-Vaping Policies Curb Drinking Externalities? Evidence from E-Cigarette Taxation and Traffic Fatalities (November 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30670, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4282520

Dhaval Dave (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - NY Office

365 Fifth Avenue, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10016-4309
United States

Bentley University - Department of Economics ( email )

175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452-4705
United States

Yang Liang

San Diego State University - Department of Economics ( email )

5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182
United States

Joanna Catherine Maclean

George Mason University ( email )

Joseph Sabia

San Diego State University - Department of Economics ( email )

5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182
United States

Matthew Braaksma

The University of Minnesota ( email )

MN
United States

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