Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition Among Publishers

UPF Working Paper No. 678

47 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2003

See all articles by Doh-Shin Jeon

Doh-Shin Jeon

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze

Date Written: April 21, 2003

Abstract

Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives for the publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journal market. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenously given, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisher finds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit but reduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishers might have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundling than without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industry profit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers' incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers under bundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive to interconnect.

Keywords: Bundling, site licensing, interconnection, merger

JEL Classification: D4, K21, L41, L82

Suggested Citation

Jeon, Doh-Shin and Menicucci, Domenico, Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition Among Publishers (April 21, 2003). UPF Working Paper No. 678, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=428280 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.428280

Doh-Shin Jeon (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34) 93 542 16 57 (Phone)
(34) 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze ( email )

via delle pandette 9
Firenze, 50127
Italy
+39-055-4374666 (Phone)
+39-055-4374913 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dmd.unifi.it/index.php?loc=personal&id=d.menicucci

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
Abstract Views
1,855
rank
307,674
PlumX Metrics