Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces

30 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2022 Last revised: 3 Feb 2023

See all articles by Matthew Elliott

Matthew Elliott

University of Cambridge

Andrea Galeotti

London Business School

Andrew Koh

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Wenhao Li

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: November 22, 2022

Abstract

There are many markets that are networked in these sense that not all consumers have access to (or are aware of) all products, while, at the same time, firms have some information about consumers and can distinguish some consumers from some others (for example, in online markets through cookies). With unit demand and price-setting firms we give a complete characterization of all welfare outcomes achievable in equilibrium (for arbitrary buyer-seller networks and arbitrary information structures), as well as the designs (networks and information structures) which implement them.

Suggested Citation

Elliott, Matthew and Galeotti, Andrea and Koh, Andrew and Li, Wenhao, Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces (November 22, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4283968 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4283968

Matthew Elliott

University of Cambridge ( email )

Trinity Ln
Cambridge, CB2 1TN
United Kingdom

Andrea Galeotti

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Andrew Koh (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
8579284892 (Phone)

Wenhao Li

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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