Geopolitical Competition, Globalization and WTO Reform

30 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2022 Last revised: 16 Feb 2023

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School

Douglas Nelson

Tulane University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 24, 2022

Abstract

This paper discusses options to manage spillovers of unilateral trade policies motivated by national
security and other noneconomic objectives on global trade and investment. Within the WTO
framework, we argue a ‘specific trade concern’ mechanism is likely to be more effective than dispute settlement to address national security-motivated trade intervention. More broadly, we propose creation of a platform for governments, supported by relevant international organizations, to enhance transparency and assess the effectiveness and magnitude of the spillover effects of trade/related policies of systemic import. This would serve to help identify efficient instruments to achieve economic and noneconomic goals and inform WTO reform discussions on subsidies and discriminatory trade policies. Plurilateral cooperation among like-minded nations offers a pragmatic pathway to address spillover effects of policies to achieve security and other noneconomic objectives but requires a stronger governance framework to ensure consistency with an open multilateral trading system.

Keywords: Globalization, geopolitics, national security, values, noneconomic objectives, WTO

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Mavroidis, Petros C. and Nelson, Douglas R., Geopolitical Competition, Globalization and WTO Reform (November 24, 2022). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSC_67, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4285644 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4285644

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

via Boccaccio 121
Florence, Florence 50133
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

Douglas R. Nelson

Tulane University - Department of Economics ( email )

New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

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