The Shifting Finance of Electricity Generation

87 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2022 Last revised: 16 Jan 2024

See all articles by Aleksandar Andonov

Aleksandar Andonov

University of Amsterdam and CEPR

Joshua D. Rauh

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Hoover Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 19, 2024

Abstract

Despite the incentives of incumbent domestic listed corporations (DLCs) in the electricity generation industry, private equity, institutional investors, and foreign corporations have played an outsized role in financing the energy transition. These new entrants are twice as likely to create power plants as incumbents. They owned 58% of wind, 47% of solar, and 34% of natural gas electricity production as of 2020. The ownership changes are concentrated in deregulated wholesale markets which attract more capital from new entrants to create renewable and natural gas plants, acquire existing plants, and accelerate the decommissioning of coal plants. Sales of fossil fuel plants from DLCs to foreign corporations result in some leakage, but private equity has similar decommissioning rates to incumbents. The new ownership types create more efficient power plants with a lower heat rate and improve the efficiency of acquired plants. Our results also highlight an important tradeoff in bringing new financing sources to the electricity sector. When selling electricity, private equity and foreign corporations use contracts with shorter duration, shorter increment pricing, and more peak-period sales, and obtain a $2.59 higher average price per MWh.

Keywords: innovation, ownership, private equity, power plants, utilities, electricity, regulation, energy

JEL Classification: G23, G24, G32, H54, L51, L71, L94, O13, Q41, Q48.

Suggested Citation

Andonov, Aleksandar and Rauh, Joshua D., The Shifting Finance of Electricity Generation (September 19, 2024). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 4287123, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4287123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4287123

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Joshua D. Rauh

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Hoover Institution ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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