Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering: Decentralized Refereeing by Smart Contracts

22 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2022

See all articles by Sylvain Carre

Sylvain Carre

Université Paris Dauphine; LEDa

Franck Gabriel

University of Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Institute of Finance and Insurance Science (ISFA)

Clément Hongler

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Gustavo Lacerda

Independent

Gloria Capano

Independent

Date Written: November 30, 2022

Abstract

We introduce the SPRIG (Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering) protocol. SPRIG allows agents to propose, question, and defend mathematical proofs in a decentralized fashion. A structure of stakes and bounties aims at producing debates in good faith and if those persist, they must go down to machine-level details, where they can be settled automatically. This combination of economic incentives and an oracle is designed to promote succinct and informative proofs. SPRIG can run autonomously as a smart contract on a blockchain platform, and hence it does not rely on a central trusted institution.

We translate SPRIG into a general game-theoretic model and prove that the protocol satisfies two desirable properties: no spamming and monotonicity. We then characterize analytically the equilibrium of a simple two-player specification of the model: this provides important insights into the impact of the protocol's parameters on the probabilities that it induces type I/II errors. We conclude by discussing the main attacks SPRIG's designers will need to take into account.

Keywords: information economics, blockchain, smart contracts, mathematical proof, formal verification, incentivization, game theory, perfect Bayesian equilibrium

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D89

Suggested Citation

Carre, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Clément and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria, Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering: Decentralized Refereeing by Smart Contracts (November 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4289599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4289599

Sylvain Carre (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

LEDa ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Franck Gabriel

University of Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Institute of Finance and Insurance Science (ISFA) ( email )

50, Avenue Tony Garnier
Lyon Cedex 07, 69366
France

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/franck-gabriel-en/home

Clément Hongler

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Gustavo Lacerda

Independent ( email )

Gloria Capano

Independent ( email )

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