The ‘Next’ War Should Have Been Fought in Cyberspace, Right? An Analysis of Cyber-Activities in the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War

Abstract

Given the integration of ICT in social interaction and in modern society at large, it is only logical that armed forces have factually developed cyber capabilities for that ‘niche’ kind of social interaction – warfare – too. After officially embracing cyberspace as a warfighting domain, the prediction that ‘the next war will be fought in cyberspace (too)’ was not an absurd idea. At first glance, the on-going ‘next’ war, the armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, this assumption appears to be flawed. However, the question that deserves answering is whether cyber capabilities have indeed been used, and if so, what effects were sought, by whom, and against what/who. What appears obvious is that – as expected – digital influence or soft-cyber operations have been used by both fighting parties. Unexpected is the rather limited number of ‘hacks’ or hard-cyber operations so far that can be attributed to the warring armed forces, for which explanations will be sought. Unforeseen however, is the number of non-state hacktivist groups, such as Anonymous and the IT Army of Ukraine, that have joined the wider conflict on both sides with soft- and hard-cyber operations. Most notably, are the numerous public and commercial ICT-service providers that – in various way are actively engaged in this war and/or in the wider conflict; whether as a result of sanctions, or on moral or commercial grounds. Hence, the ‘next’ war was indeed conducted in cyberspace too, however, in another way as predicted, especially when looking at the wider conflict.

Keywords: cyberspace, Russo-Ukraine War, hard-cyber operations, soft-cyber operations, digital influence operations, Future of War

JEL Classification: F51, F52, N40