Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property

84 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2004

See all articles by Paul M. Schwartz

Paul M. Schwartz

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

William Michael Treanor

Georgetown University Law Center


Since the ratification of the constitution, intellectual property law in the United States has always been, in part, constitutional law. Among the enumerated powers that Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress is the power to create certain intellectual property rights. To a remarkable extent, scholars who have examined the Constitution's Copyright Clause have reached a common position. With striking unanimity, these scholars have called for aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area. The champions of this position - we refer to them as the IP Restrictors - represent a remarkable array of constitutional and intellectual property scholars.

In this terms's Eldred v. Aschroft, leading IP Restrictor Lawrence Lessig, representing petitioner Eric Eldred, sought to convince the Supreme Court that the IP Restrictors' view of the Copyright Clause was the correct one. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court rejected Eldred's claim and upheld the statute. But while the Court rejected the IP Restrictors' vision, it did not offer a satisfactory competing conception of the Copyright Clause and how the courts should construe it. Critically, even though the standard of review was of central significance, the Court applied a deferential form of rational basis scrutiny without explaining why this was the appropriate standard.

This paper develops the case for deferential review of congressional legislation in the area of intellectual property and, at a deeper level, offers a new paradigm for understanding the Copyright Clause. We propose that from the vantage point of constitutional law, intellectual property should be treated as a form of constitutional property. Deference to congressional judgments is warranted because congressional legislation affecting intellectual property is analytically similar to congressional legislation affecting other forms of property. Courts subject congressional legislation affecting traditional forms of property to deferential review because of concerns about institutional competence and respect for majoritarian decisionmaking. These two concerns in conjunction with proper regard for holistic constitutional interpretation should also lead courts to deferential review of congressional legislation affecting intellectual property.

In developing our position, we draw on constitutional history and, in particular, the lessons of Lochner v. New York. In defense of their vision of the Constitution, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters in Eldred make claims about the original understanding that, to an astonishing extent, echo those made by proponents of Lochner-era jurisprudence. We argue, however, that these claims fail for two reasons. First, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters disregard the limited scope of judicial review at the time of the Founding. Additionally, the IP Restrictors and dissenters disregard the range of views among the Founders about monopolies.

Suggested Citation

Schwartz, Paul M. and Treanor, William Michael, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property. Fordham School of Law, Pub-Law Research Paper No. 23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=429161

Paul M. Schwartz (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall #7200
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

William Michael Treanor

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9030 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/treanor-william-m.cfm

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