Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence: Supernatural Superserious

20 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2022 Last revised: 4 Mar 2024

See all articles by Mario Stella Richter

Mario Stella Richter

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Maria Lucia Passador

Bocconi University - Department of Law; Harvard University - Harvard Law School; European Banking Institute

Date Written: December 3, 2022

Abstract

The article discusses the main issues related to the Proposal of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, particularly highlighting the paradigm shift it sets forth, namely from the right to due diligence to the duty of due diligence.
Along with the considerations expressed on the matter by prominent European legal scholars, our review and assessment on the proposal is also based on the examination of the implications that the directive would have in the EU and in other countries, especially in the United States, and on the solutions adopted elsewhere, such as in theUnited Kingdom. Furthermore, the paper warns that the Directive may have negative consequences for the competitiveness and governance of European companies and may serve as an alibi for the lack of effective public policies and regulations in the fields of human rights and environmental protection.
Despite the proposed Directive’s intentions, we believe that it will not save the planet and calls for a more realistic and coherent approach to corporate sustainability. Additionally, the critiques raised against the directive at stake by the leading EU association on the matter, the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, are also examined.

Keywords: Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, EU law, company law, corporate governance, corporate boards, due diligence, global value chains, shareholder primacy, SDGs, climate change

JEL Classification: Q58, K32, K22

Suggested Citation

Stella Richter, Mario and Passador, Maria Lucia, Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence: Supernatural Superserious (December 3, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4293912 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4293912

Mario Stella Richter

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

via Cracovia 50
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

Maria Lucia Passador (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Banking Institute ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

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