Choice Over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort

43 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2022

See all articles by Martin Abel

Martin Abel

Bowdoin College

Rulof Burger

Stellenbosch University

Abstract

We study the effect of monetary incentives on effort in a prosocial task: writing letters encouraging voter turnout. Volunteers are randomized to receive no incentive, unconditional upfront payment, payment conditional on completing the task, or to have a choice between the two payment schemes. The unconditional and conditional payment both increase task completion rates by about 18 percentage points (43%). Giving people a choice between the payment scheme doubles the effect on task completion (35 p.p., 84%). Unlike unconditional payments, a choice over contracts also increases time spent on the task and letter quality. Survey responses suggest that giving people a choice is effective because it increases task ownership rather than the desire to return a favor or avoid feelings of guilt.

Keywords: self determination, gift exchange, guilt aversion, labor supply

JEL Classification: D86, D91, J22

Suggested Citation

Abel, Martin and Burger, Rulof, Choice Over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort. IZA Discussion Paper No. 15769, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4294394 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4294394

Martin Abel (Contact Author)

Bowdoin College ( email )

Brunswick, ME 04011
United States

Rulof Burger

Stellenbosch University ( email )

Private Bag X1
Stellenbosch, Western Cape 7602
South Africa

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