Is public distrust of the finance sector warranted? Evidence from financial adviser misconduct

58 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2022 Last revised: 20 Dec 2024

See all articles by Nihad Aliyev

Nihad Aliyev

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - School of Finance and Economics

Inji Allahverdiyeva

University of Technology Sydney (UTS)

Tālis J. Putniņš

University of Technology Sydney (UTS); Digital Finance CRC; Stockholm School of Economics, Riga

Date Written: December 8, 2022

Abstract

Using data from over one million financial advisers in the U.S., we estimate that up to 30% of advisers are involved in misconduct, but only about one-third of these cases are reported by regulators. Advisers with a high propensity for misconduct oversee approximately $6.9 trillion assets under management (AUM). The rates of adviser misconduct and unreported cases increase during the GFC, paralleling the decline of trust in financial institutions. One misconduct costs a firm nearly 9 clients and $14 million AUM annually. We provide a list of characteristics for consumers, advisory firms, and regulators to help identify adviser misconduct.

Keywords: Trust, financial advisers, financial misconduct, consumer finance

JEL Classification: G24, G28, D18

Suggested Citation

Aliyev, Nihad and Allahverdiyeva, Inji and Putnins, Talis J., Is public distrust of the finance sector warranted? Evidence from financial adviser misconduct (December 8, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296833 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4296833

Nihad Aliyev (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - School of Finance and Economics ( email )

Haymarket
Sydney, NSW 2007
Australia

Inji Allahverdiyeva

University of Technology Sydney (UTS)

Talis J. Putnins

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) ( email )

PO Box 123
Broadway
Sydney
Australia
+61 2 9514 3088 (Phone)

Digital Finance CRC ( email )

Stockholm School of Economics, Riga ( email )

Strelnieku iela 4a
Riga, LV 1010
Latvia
+371 67015841 (Phone)

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