Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets
39 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2022 Last revised: 7 Feb 2023
Date Written: 2022
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.
Keywords: Energy market, Game theory, Auctions/bidding, Congestion management, Inc-dec gaming
JEL Classification: D43, D44, L13, Q41, Q48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation