Diversity Targets

61 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2022 Last revised: 27 Nov 2023

See all articles by Wei Cai

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School

Yue Chen

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Shivaram Rajgopal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation

Li Yang

Columbia Business School

Date Written: November 21, 2022

Abstract

From 2008 to 2020, 180 of S&P 1500 have disclosed employee diversity targets. We conduct the first analysis of firms’ employee diversity targets and ask three research questions: (i) who announces diversity targets? (ii) do firms deliver on their diversity targets? (iii) what are the implications of disclosure of such targets for employee hiring and investors? We find that firms with a greater willingness (proxied by past ESG penalties, higher CEO-to-median employee pay ratio, more media coverage, and after #Metoo and BLM movements) and ability (proxied by financial strength, a blue-collar heavy labor force, and gender and ethnic minorities on boards) to improve employee diversity are more likely to disclose diversity targets. Exploiting the Revelio dataset of 15,639 firm-years for 1,203 distinct firms from 2008 to 2020, we observe that firms that disclosed a diversity target have indeed hired more diverse employees, but such diversity levels have already increased substantially prior to the target disclosure. Firms with numerical, forward-looking, and rank-and-file employee-targeted goals are associated with greater employee diversity relative to firms that announce other types of diversity goals. Moreover, improved diversity performance does not appear to occur at the cost of employee quality, as measured by the Revelio dataset. Overall, our results have practical implications for how investors and stakeholders might want to interpret corporate diversity targets.

Keywords: Diveristy Targets, ESG Disclosure

JEL Classification: M14,M42

Suggested Citation

Cai, Wei and Chen, Yue and Rajgopal, Shivaram and Yang, Li, Diversity Targets (November 21, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4301472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4301472

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Yue Chen

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Shivaram Rajgopal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Li Yang (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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