The Effect of Compassion Fade on Altruistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence For a Guilt Mitigation Account

63 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2022 Last revised: 16 Jun 2023

See all articles by Ben Grodeck

Ben Grodeck

University of Exeter

Toby Handfield

Monash University

Matthew Kopec

Northeastern University Ethics Institute

Date Written: December 14, 2022

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the phenomenon of compassion fade: a tendency to act less altruistically when faced with more, rather than fewer individuals in need. Using variations of the dictator game, our design allows us to explore both the determinants of compassion fade, and the mechanism by which it operates. In our first experiment, which uses a between-subject design (n=187), we find that adding a second recipient to a dictator game who always receives a payoff of zero, regardless of the decision-maker’s choice, significantly increases selfish behavior. We follow up with a large-scale experiment on Amazon mTurk using a within-subject design (n= 711). We again find that adding a second unhelpable individual who is in a needy state significantly increases the rate of selfish behavior. However, we also find that compassion fade is sensitive to the level of “need” – of the additional individual. When the unhelpable recipient is not in a needy state, decision makers act significantly less selfishly, compared to when they are in a needy state. Finally, we present evidence that the mechanism of compassion fade is diminishing negative affect (e.g., guilt) that arises from selfish decisions, rather than through the diminishment of warm glow.

Keywords: pro-social behavior, motivated reasoning, altruism, experimental economics, psychology, compassion fade

JEL Classification: D91, C91, D64

Suggested Citation

Grodeck, Ben and Handfield, Toby and Kopec, Matthew, The Effect of Compassion Fade on Altruistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence For a Guilt Mitigation Account (December 14, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4301600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4301600

Ben Grodeck (Contact Author)

University of Exeter ( email )

Exeter, EX4 4ST
United Kingdom

Toby Handfield

Monash University ( email )

3800
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://tobyhandfield.com

Matthew Kopec

Northeastern University Ethics Institute ( email )

220 B RP
Boston, MA 02115
United States

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