Remedial Actions After Corporate Social Irresponsibility

54 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2022

See all articles by Wei Cai

Wei Cai

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Aneesh Raghunandan

London School of Economics

Shivaram Rajgopal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation

Wenxin Wang

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: December 16, 2022

Abstract

We examine whether firms take remedial actions in response to major violations of (i) environmental law; (ii) labor laws associated with wage theft, workplace safety, and discrimination; and (iii) consumer safety rules. To empirically address this question, we construct a novel, hand-collected dataset of remedial actions taken by firms, based on hand-classification of 10,270 press releases, in the years preceding and subsequent to a major violation (e.g., an oil spill or a major labor lawsuit verdict). Regardless of whether the firm is exposed for environmental or social (labor and customer) violations, remedial actions seem to focus on customers and employees, especially women. Remedial actions in response to violations occur more frequently in more diverse workplaces. In terms of consequences, the effect of remedial actions on recidivism varies with the type of underlying violation: after an environmental violation, only direct environment-focused remedial actions (but not any type of action targeting investors, customers, or employees) are correlated with a reduction in future environmental violations. Conversely, after a social violation, indirect actions – especially those targeted at consumers – appear to be correlated with fewer future violations.

Keywords: reputation repair, corporate social responsibility, ESG, labor violation, environmental violation

JEL Classification: M14, G23, G34, M41

Suggested Citation

Cai, Wei and Raghunandan, Aneesh and Rajgopal, Shivaram and Wang, Wenxin, Remedial Actions After Corporate Social Irresponsibility (December 16, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4305248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4305248

Wei Cai

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Aneesh Raghunandan (Contact Author)

London School of Economics ( email )

United Kingdom

Shivaram Rajgopal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Wenxin Wang

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
171
Abstract Views
568
Rank
267,671
PlumX Metrics