Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation

65 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2003  

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank - Development Research Group; World Bank

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ross Levine

UC Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

Suggested Citation

Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Laeven, Luc and Levine, Ross, Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation (August 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9890. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=430604

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank - Development Research Group ( email )

United States
202-473-7479 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ademirguckunt/

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Luc A. Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Ross Eric Levine (Contact Author)

UC Berkeley ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
66
Rank
19,227
Abstract Views
1,771