Pandemic Lending: Micro and Macro Effects of Model-Based Regulation

71 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2022

See all articles by Franco Fiordelisi

Franco Fiordelisi

University of Essex - Essex Business School

GIULIA fusi

University of Nottingham

Angela Maddaloni

European Central Bank (ECB)

David Marques-Ibanez

European Central Bank (ECB)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 20, 2022

Abstract

When the COVID-19 crisis struck, banks using internal-rating based (IRB) models quickly recognized the increase in risk and reduced lending more than banks using a standardized approach. This effect is not driven by borrowers’ quality or by banks in countries with credit booms before the pandemic. The higher risk sensitivity of IRB models does not always result in lower credit provision when risk intensifies. Certain features of the IRB models – the use of a downturn Loss Given Default parameter – can increase banks’ resilience and preserve their intermediation capacity also during downturns. Affected borrowers were not able to fully insulate and decreased corporate investments.

Keywords: Model-based regulation, Banks, Supervision, Lending, COVID-19

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Fiordelisi, Franco and fusi, GIULIA and Maddaloni, Angela and Marques-Ibanez, David, Pandemic Lending: Micro and Macro Effects of Model-Based Regulation (December 20, 2022). SAFE Working Paper No. 374, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4307670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4307670

Franco Fiordelisi

University of Essex - Essex Business School ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

GIULIA Fusi

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Angela Maddaloni (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

David Marques-Ibanez

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany
49 6913 44 6460 (Phone)
49 6913 44 6460 (Fax)

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