A Surrebuttal: There Are No Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership in the Airline Industry

16 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2022

See all articles by Patrick J. Dennis

Patrick J. Dennis

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

Kristopher Gerardi

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Carola Schenone

University of Virginia - McIntire School

Date Written: December 20, 2022

Abstract

The influential paper by Azar et al. (2018) presents empirical evidence from the airline industry that institutional investors who own shares in firms that are product-market rivals leads to anti-competitive behavior and higher prices. Dennis et al. (2022) refute this contention and show using a placebo analysis that the results in Azar et al. (2018) are driven by the market share component of the measure of common ownership rather than the investor component. Azar et al. (2022) present a critique of the Dennis et al. (2022) placebo analysis and argue that the conclusions of Azar et al. (2018) are valid. This paper shows that the conclusions in Dennis et al. (2022) still hold in light of the Azar et al. (2022) critique.

Keywords: Common Owners, Competition, Airlines

JEL Classification: G33, G34, G38, L41, L11

Suggested Citation

Dennis, Patrick J. and Gerardi, Kristopher S. and Schenone, Carola, A Surrebuttal: There Are No Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership in the Airline Industry (December 20, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4307814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4307814

Patrick J. Dennis (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )

P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
804-924-4050 (Phone)

Kristopher S. Gerardi

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8561 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/kristophergerardishomepage/

Carola Schenone

University of Virginia - McIntire School ( email )

Rouss and Robertson Halls
125 Ruppel Drive
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-4184 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
116
Abstract Views
457
Rank
456,083
PlumX Metrics