Political Trust and Democracy: The Critical Citizens Thesis Re-Examined

Forthcoming in Democratization; DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2257607

40 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2023 Last revised: 30 Sep 2023

See all articles by Andrew Dawson

Andrew Dawson

York University

Isabel Krakoff

York University - Department of Sociology

Date Written: December 20, 2022

Abstract

This paper empirically assesses competing perspectives of the relationship between democracy and political trust. We conduct multilevel analyses on a cross-national panel dataset of 82 countries for the period 1990-2020. The findings suggest that there is a strong, negative relationship between democracy and political trust that cannot easily be dismissed as an artifact of model misspecification or response bias. Moreover, we re-examine the critical citizens thesis by disaggregating political trust into trust in partisan and “non-partisan” institutions to test the claim that well-functioning democracies contain and channel distrust into the more partisan political institutions to keep distrust from generalizing to the entire political system. The results fail to find a statistically significant difference of the effect of democracy on trust between partisan and non-partisan institutions, suggesting that low political trust may be a stronger contributor to democratic decline than much of the literature suggests.

Keywords: Democracy; Political Trust; Cross-National; Quantitative Methods

Suggested Citation

Dawson, Andrew and Krakoff, Isabel, Political Trust and Democracy: The Critical Citizens Thesis Re-Examined (December 20, 2022). Forthcoming in Democratization; DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2257607, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4307936 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4307936

Andrew Dawson (Contact Author)

York University ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

Isabel Krakoff

York University - Department of Sociology

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