Beyond Collusion Resistance: Leveraging Social Information for Plural Funding and Voting

28 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2022 Last revised: 1 Feb 2023

See all articles by Joel Miller

Joel Miller

University of Illinois at Chicago - College of Engineering; Microsoft Research

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Leon Erichsen

Gitcoin

Date Written: December 24, 2022

Abstract

In its 2018 introduction and subsequent work, Quadratic Funding (QF) emerged as a uniquely optimal design for the democratic provision of public goods under the assumption of atomized participants with perfect rationality. In this paper, we aim to move past this rational and atomized portrayal of human beings and explore pluralistic QF mechanisms that recognize the influence of social connections among participants and incentivize cooperation across social differences. With this goal in mind, we define collusion resistance as a criterion against disproportional power accumulation in Quadratic Funding models that can arise from pre-existing participant relationships and argue that collusion resistant QF and plural QF are two sides of the same coin. Next, we evaluate various iterations of Quadratic Funding, testing their collusion resistance and other social and technical issues. Finally, we propose several new mechanisms, including Connection-Oriented Cluster Match, which satisfies our definition of collusion resistance. Our findings show great potential for making Quadratic Funding more pluralistic. They might also guide principles and practices of computational design that bridge the epistemological divides between classical economics and social reality.

Keywords: Quadratic Funding, Mechanism Design, Pluralism, Web3, Public Goods, Collusion

JEL Classification: D82, D63, P48, D61, D71, H41, D85, D70

Suggested Citation

Miller, Joel and Weyl, Eric Glen and Erichsen, Leon, Beyond Collusion Resistance: Leveraging Social Information for Plural Funding and Voting (December 24, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4311507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4311507

Joel Miller (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Chicago - College of Engineering ( email )

851 South Morgan
College of Engineering (M/C 159)
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

Microsoft Research ( email )

Redomond, WA 98052

Eric Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Leon Erichsen

Gitcoin

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