Towards a Technological Overhaul of American Antitrust

Antitrust, Vol .37 No. 1 (2022)

7 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2023

See all articles by Ginger Zhe Jin

Ginger Zhe Jin

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Liad Wagman

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management & Technology

Date Written: December 27, 2022

Abstract

Recent outcry for antitrust reform argues that U.S. markets have become more concentrated, that large firms’ profit margins have increased, and that part of these changes may be attributed to lax antitrust enforcement since the 1960s. While each of these arguments is part of an intense intellectual discourse, politicians have released numerous legislative proposals for what they presumably believe would fix antitrust practices. Despite the clamor, one tangible and factual reason for antitrust reform has not received adequate attention: the informational infrastructure within the U.S. antitrust system massively lags behind the development of the digital economy. That is, the federal antitrust agencies are improperly equipped to organize and operationalize knowledge in enforcement. As a result, the agencies may miss critical warning signs of potential anticompetitive conduct, since they are often unequipped to properly identify issues and do not allocate existing resources effectively (let alone ask Congress for the right kind of resources).

Keywords: antitrust, FTC, digital transformation, competition, economics, data analytics

JEL Classification: K21, l50

Suggested Citation

Jin, Ginger Zhe and Sokol, D. Daniel and Wagman, Liad, Towards a Technological Overhaul of American Antitrust (December 27, 2022). Antitrust, Vol .37 No. 1 (2022), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4312406

Ginger Zhe Jin

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3484 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

Liad Wagman

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management & Technology ( email )

110 8th St
Troy, NY 12180
United States

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