Enforcing the Digital Markets Act: Institutional Choices, Compliance, and Antitrust

41 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2023

See all articles by Alexandre de Streel

Alexandre de Streel

University of Namur; Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf

David Dinielli

Yale - Tobin Center for Economic Policy

Gene Kimmelman

Public Knowledge

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Rupprecht Podszun

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Faculty of Law

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 1, 2022

Abstract

The European Commission is charged with implementing the Digital Markets Act (DMA) which will impose a list of 22 do and don't to Big Tech platforms in March 2024. Based on economic and legal reasoning, this paper asks how the Commission can fulfil this challenging task effectively. The paper make recommendations about how the Commission might prioritize cases, design optimal internal work structures, maximize the compliance mechanism’s effectiveness, avoid reinventing at least some wheels by leaning on antitrust tools and knowledge, and leveraging the Commission’s concurrent antitrust and regulatory powers to ensure the speedy and effective resolution of current and future investigations.

Keywords: EU regulation, antitrust, Big Tech, regulatory design

JEL Classification: K21, K23, K42, L41, L50

Suggested Citation

de Streel, Alexandre and Crémer, Jacques and Heidhues, Paul and Dinielli, David and Kimmelman, Gene and Monti, Giorgio and Podszun, Rupprecht and Schnitzer, Monika and Scott Morton, Fiona M., Enforcing the Digital Markets Act: Institutional Choices, Compliance, and Antitrust (December 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4314848 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4314848

Alexandre De Streel

University of Namur ( email )

8 rempart de la vierge
Namur, 5000
Belgium

Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Av Louise 475/10
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 1
Duesseldorf, DE NRW 40225
Germany

David Dinielli

Yale - Tobin Center for Economic Policy ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

Gene Kimmelman

Public Knowledge ( email )

1818 N Street, NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/g-monti

Rupprecht Podszun

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Faculty of Law

Universitätsstr. 1
Düsseldorf, D-40225
Germany

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Fiona M. Scott Morton (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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