Introducing an Index of Rent Seeking: A Synthetic Matching Approach

19 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2023 Last revised: 7 Jan 2023

See all articles by Vitor Melo

Vitor Melo

Clemson University; Mercatus Center; Initiative on Enabling Choice and Competition at the University of Chicago

Elijah Neilson

Southern Utah University

Date Written: January 3, 2023

Abstract

Despite Gordon Tullock’s famous effort to motivate researchers to quantify investments in rent seeking, the empirical measurement of rent-seeking activity remains under-studied. This paper proposes a new estimate of rent seeking by comparing the industrial composition of MSAs that contain a state capital with those of a comparable synthetic match. Each of these synthetic matches are constructed as a weighted average of all MSAs that do not contain a state capital, where the weights are chosen via entropy balancing. This paper offers the first panel estimate of rent seeking in the United States by state and year for the years 2004-2020. We also provide the first industry-specific measures of rent seeking, in addition to aggregate indexes of traditional, in-kind, indirect, and total rent seeking. All measures of rent seeking described in this paper have been made publicly available.

Keywords: Rent Seeking, Lobbying, Corruption

JEL Classification: D72, H70, C13

Suggested Citation

Melo, Vitor and Neilson, Elijah, Introducing an Index of Rent Seeking: A Synthetic Matching Approach (January 3, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4316691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4316691

Vitor Melo (Contact Author)

Clemson University ( email )

Clemson, SC 29631
United States

Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Initiative on Enabling Choice and Competition at the University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Elijah Neilson

Southern Utah University ( email )

351 West Center Street
Cedar City, UT 84720
United States

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