Public Perception and Autonomous Vehicle Liability

Harvard Business School Research Paper Series Working Paper 23-036

Posted: 6 Jan 2023 Last revised: 17 Jan 2023

See all articles by Julian De Freitas

Julian De Freitas

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Xilin Zhou

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Margherita Atzei

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Shoshana Boardman

Harvard University

Luigi Di Lillo

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Date Written: January 13, 2023

Abstract

The deployment of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and the accompanying societal and economic benefits will greatly depend on how much liability AV firms will have to carry for accidents involving these vehicles, which in turn impacts their insurability and associated insurance premiums. We investigate whether accidents where the AV was not at-fault could become an unexpected liability risk for AV firms, by exploring public perceptions of AV liability and defectiveness. We find that when such accidents occur, what is salient to consumers is that the human occupant of the AV was not in control. This leads consumers to spontaneously entertain counterfactuals in which the human occupant had more control of the vehicle, and to conclude that in such a case the human would have acted more optimally to prevent or avoid the accident, even if the human did not cause it. Given this inference, consumers conclude that the technology is preventing or impeding the driver from acting in their interests, leading consumers to judge AV firms as more liable than both HDV firms and HDV drivers for the damages. Suggesting potential intervention routes, we find that consumers are more likely to show this response pattern if they do not trust AVs.

Keywords: Autonomous vehicles, moral judgment, insurance, liability, harm

Suggested Citation

De Freitas, Julian and Zhou, Xilin and Atzei, Margherita and Boardman, Shoshana and Di Lillo, Luigi, Public Perception and Autonomous Vehicle Liability (January 13, 2023). Harvard Business School Research Paper Series Working Paper 23-036, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4318764 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4318764

Julian De Freitas (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Xilin Zhou

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Mythenquai 50/60
P.O. Box
CH-8022 Zurich
Switzerland

Margherita Atzei

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Mythenquai 50/60
P.O. Box
CH-8022 Zurich
Switzerland

Shoshana Boardman

Harvard University

Luigi Di Lillo

Swiss Reinsurance Company, Ltd.

Mythenquai 50/60
P.O. Box
CH-8022 Zurich
Switzerland

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