Bank Concentration and Crises

42 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2003

See all articles by Thorsten Beck

Thorsten Beck

City University London - The Business School; Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank

Ross Levine

Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and bank fragility, this paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 70 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with (i) more concentrated banking systems, (ii) fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and (iii) national institutions that encourage competition.

Keywords: Industrial Structure, Banking System Fragility, Regulation

JEL Classification: G21, G28, L16

Suggested Citation

Beck, Thorsten and Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Levine, Ross, Bank Concentration and Crises (August 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=432081

Thorsten Beck (Contact Author)

City University London - The Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Ross Levine

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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