The DMA: A New Regulation for – or Against – Digital Markets in the EU?

Abstract

The recent approval of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) has been a milestone in the regulation of large internet platforms operating in the new digital ecosystems. Faced with the supposed ineffectiveness and slowness of the tools traditionally used to limit the power and harmful practices for the market and consumers, mainly the prohibition of abuse of dominant position in Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission has created a new tool that acts ex ante and does not require proof of restrictive effects. It is a list of obligations and prohibitions to be imposed on the so-called “gatekeepers” providing “core platform services”. Despite the debate that has accompanied the whole process of drafting the DMA, and the care that has been taken in its design, there are many weaknesses in the final text. Both in the substantive design of the new categories, and especially in the procedural issues necessary for their implementation, the new regulation faces certain downsides that would be advisable to avoid. This paper examines these issues, with particular emphasis on the flawed interrelationship between the DMA and EU competition law.

Keywords: DMA, gatekeepers, platform regulation, competition law, core platform services, implementation

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K23, L12, L13, L4, L5, L41, L43, L86, D4