Citations (3)


Footnotes (166)



The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Startups

Victor Fleischer

University of San Diego School of Law

August 7, 2003

UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-20

This Article takes the bursting of the dot com bubble as an opportunity to reevaluate the tax structure of venture capital startups. By organizing startups as corporations rather than as partnerships, investors and entrepreneurs seem to leave money on the table by failing to fully use tax losses - especially since the vast majority of startups fail. Conventional wisdom attributes the lack of attention paid to losses to a "gambler's mentality" or optimism bias. I argue here that the use of the corporate form is, in fact, rational, or at least that there is a method to the madness.

I make four main points. First, the tax losses are not as valuable as they might seem; tax rules prohibit many investors from capturing the full benefit of the losses. Second, the VC professionals who structure the deals do not personally share in the losses, so they have little reason to care about the tax effects of the losses. Third, gains are taxed more favorably if the startup is organized as a corporation from the outset, and again, this favorable treatment of gains is especially attractive to the VC professionals - further evidence that agency costs may be playing a role here. Fourth, corporations are less complex than partnerships: organizing as a corporation minimizes legal costs and simplifies employee compensation and exit strategy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: tax, venture capital, behavioral economics, startups

JEL Classification: K34

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 18, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Fleischer, Victor, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Startups (August 7, 2003). UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=432840 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.432840

Contact Information

Victor Fleischer (Contact Author)
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,774
Downloads: 946
Download Rank: 17,621
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  166
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper