Information Disclosure and Marriage Quality: Evidence from Premarital Medical Exams

47 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2023

See all articles by Chenyuan Liu

Chenyuan Liu

Wisconsin School of Business; Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Yueyuan Ma

Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Binzhen Wu

Tsinghua University: School of Economics and Management; Tsinghua University: NIFS (National Institute for Fiscal Studies)

Date Written: January 19, 2023

Abstract

Many countries vary in their regulations regarding premarital health examinations, which is a form of information disclosure. To examine how premarital health examinations affect marriage quality and children’s health, we exploit a policy shock in China that changes premarital health examinations from mandatory to voluntary. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, this policy shock significantly increases the marriage probability while decreasing positive assortative matching in health among married couples. We also find an increase in low birth weight rates after the policy shock. Our findings suggest that mandatory premarital examination is beneficial in promoting the quality of marriage and children's health.

Note:
Funding Information: We acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project ID: 72073079)
Declaration of Interests: The authors (Chengyuan Liu, Yueyuan Ma, Binzhen Wu) declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper of "Information Disclosure and Marriage Quality: Evidence from Premarital Medical Exams".

Keywords: Information disclosure; Premarital health examination; Assortative matching; Marriage quality; Children's health quality

JEL Classification: I18; D82; J12

Suggested Citation

Liu, Chenyuan and Liu, Chenyuan and Ma, Yueyuan and Wu, Binzhen, Information Disclosure and Marriage Quality: Evidence from Premarital Medical Exams (January 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4331141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4331141

Chenyuan Liu

Wisconsin School of Business ( email )

975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

HOME PAGE: http://liuchenyuan.github.io/

Yueyuan Ma

Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara ( email )

North Hall 2037
UC Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Binzhen Wu (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University: School of Economics and Management

Beijing
China
13521744052 (Phone)
100084 (Fax)

Tsinghua University: NIFS (National Institute for Fiscal Studies) ( email )

School of Economics and Management
Tsinghua University
Beijing, Beijing 100084
China

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