Repeated Refugee Resettlement

This is an updated version of GLO Discussion Paper 1237.

43 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2023 Last revised: 29 Nov 2023

See all articles by Katsunori Ohta

Katsunori Ohta

Kansai University - Faculty of Informatics

Yuji Tamura

Department of Accounting, Data Analytics, Economics and Finance, La Trobe University; ANU Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University

Date Written: November 26, 2023

Abstract

Resettlement is one means of assisting refugees to regain self-reliant living without constant fear. The global total of resettled refugees has remained fractional relative to the need. To contribute to the ongoing effort to increase resettlement, we consider voluntary sharing of full resettlement through analysis of a repeated game at the beginning of which host countries bargain over their shares. We show that the perception of refugee protection as a humanitarian public good has a direct effect of expanding cooperation opportunities and also an indirect effect of softening the negative impact of resettlement costs on the opportunities. Our finding thus makes us reconsider the implication of static-game analysis that the public-good nature of refugee protection is the source of insufficient admission. We also show that a wide range of cooperation opportunities may not be conducive to equilibrium efficiency because it allows the bargaining outcome to deviate from the one that maximizes the global payoff. We suggest policies for creating cooperation opportunities and improving equilibrium efficiency. Our framework is sufficiently general and is useful for examining other similar problems of public-good provision.

Keywords: International public good, International cooperation

JEL Classification: H41, H87

Suggested Citation

Ohta, Katsunori and Tamura, Yuji, Repeated Refugee Resettlement (November 26, 2023). This is an updated version of GLO Discussion Paper 1237., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4336195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4336195

Katsunori Ohta

Kansai University - Faculty of Informatics ( email )

2-1-1 Ryozenji-cho
Takatsuki-shi
Osaka
Japan

Yuji Tamura (Contact Author)

Department of Accounting, Data Analytics, Economics and Finance, La Trobe University ( email )

Melbourne, VIC 3086
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/accounting-data-analytics-economics-and-finance

ANU Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University

Canberra, ACT 2600
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://rse.anu.edu.au/research/centre-economic-policy-research

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