Repeated Refugee Resettlement
This is an updated version of GLO Discussion Paper 1237.
43 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2023 Last revised: 29 Nov 2023
Date Written: November 26, 2023
Abstract
Resettlement is one means of assisting refugees to regain self-reliant living without constant fear. The global total of resettled refugees has remained fractional relative to the need. To contribute to the ongoing effort to increase resettlement, we consider voluntary sharing of full resettlement through analysis of a repeated game at the beginning of which host countries bargain over their shares. We show that the perception of refugee protection as a humanitarian public good has a direct effect of expanding cooperation opportunities and also an indirect effect of softening the negative impact of resettlement costs on the opportunities. Our finding thus makes us reconsider the implication of static-game analysis that the public-good nature of refugee protection is the source of insufficient admission. We also show that a wide range of cooperation opportunities may not be conducive to equilibrium efficiency because it allows the bargaining outcome to deviate from the one that maximizes the global payoff. We suggest policies for creating cooperation opportunities and improving equilibrium efficiency. Our framework is sufficiently general and is useful for examining other similar problems of public-good provision.
Keywords: International public good, International cooperation
JEL Classification: H41, H87
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation