25 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2003
Date Written: June 2003
In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
Keywords: Democratic peace, cheap talk
JEL Classification: D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny, It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace (June 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3947. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=433844
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