A Tax-Shaped Retail Landscape

50 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2023 Last revised: 7 Sep 2024

See all articles by Feng Chi

Feng Chi

Cornell University

Limin Fang

University of British Columbia

Mengwei Lin

Cornell University

Nathan Yang

Cornell University; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: September 07, 2024

Abstract

We investigate the impact that seemingly uniform business tax policies have on shaping the retail landscape. Using data about all retail establishments in the United States, we show that while retailers are more likely to open establishments in markets that experienced decreases in business state tax, these inferred effects are more pronounced for large chains as compared with small chains. Motivated by these empirical realities, we develop an entry model where firms are subject to taxes that impact their sunk costs of entry. A key insight from this model is that taxes can potentially amplify market dominance, such that retailers with preexisting advantages are disproportionately more responsive to the tax policies.

Keywords: Business Dynamism, Entrepreneurship, Firm Size, Market Power, Public Finance, Retail Diversity, Strategic Entry, Tax Incentives, Urban Policy and Revival, Place-Based Policies

JEL Classification: L00; L13; L52; L81; R00; H25

Suggested Citation

Chi, Feng and Fang, Limin and Lin, Mengwei and Yang, Nathan, A Tax-Shaped Retail Landscape (September 07, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4338974 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4338974

Feng Chi

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/chifeng49

Limin Fang

University of British Columbia ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T1Z2
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/fangliminecon/home

Mengwei Lin

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mengwei-lin.com

Nathan Yang (Contact Author)

Cornell University ( email )

Dyson School, Warren Hall
360E
Ithaca, NY 14853-6201
United States
6072551590 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty-research/faculty/ncy6/

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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