The Enduring Relevance of the Poison Pill: A U.S.-Japan Comparative Analysis

21 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2023 Last revised: 22 Aug 2023

See all articles by Curtis J. Milhaupt

Curtis J. Milhaupt

Stanford Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Zenichi Shishido

Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law

Date Written: January 27, 2023

Abstract

More than forty years after its invention the poison pill defensive measure remains the subject of important judicial decisions and renewed academic debate concerning fundamental corporate governance questions, both in the United States, its country of origin, and in its adopted home of Japan. In this essay, we use the poison pill as a mirror, reflecting the evolution of corporate law, markets and norms in the United States and Japan. The pill’s journey from its inception in the United States and its subsequent (conceptual, but not technical) adoption in Japan to the present has taken place in markedly different corporate governance environments in the two countries. Yet today, a period characterized globally by shareholder activism and ESG agitation, the divergent paths of the pill appear to be converging, a possibility highlighted by recent judicial decisions on anti-activist pills in the Delaware courts and the Japanese Supreme Court.

The essay begins by tracing the separate, path-dependent origins of the pill in the two countries, showing how distinctions in legal technology of the pill derive from some fundamental differences in corporate law mechanics and governance norms in the two countries. Next the essay juxtaposes the near-death experience of the poison pill in Japan in the market environment prevailing in the 2010s with the contemporaneous apogee of the pill’s potency in the Delaware Chancery Court’s Airgas decision. The essay concludes by bringing the story of the pill’s enduring relevance to the present day, focusing on the current academic debate about anti-activist pills in the U.S. and the controversial recent use of a modified version of majority-of-the-minority shareholder approval (MoM) for anti-activist pills in Japan.

Keywords: Poison pill, takeover defenses, corporate governance, shareholder activism, comparative law

JEL Classification: G30, K22, P52

Suggested Citation

Milhaupt, Curtis J. and Shishido, Zenichi, The Enduring Relevance of the Poison Pill: A U.S.-Japan Comparative Analysis (January 27, 2023). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 581, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4339701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4339701

Curtis J. Milhaupt (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Zenichi Shishido

Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law ( email )

2-1-2 Hitotsubashi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8439
Japan
81-(0)3-4212-3148 (Phone)
81-(0)3-4212-3149 (Fax)

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